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The main cause of bad policy decisions is arguably a lack of information. 
Decisionmakers often do not make use of relevant information about the consequences of the 
policies they choose. The problem, however, is not simply that public officials do not exploit 
readily available information. It is also that they do not take full advantage of creative 
mechanisms that could expand the supply of policy-relevant information. Among the most 
innovative and potentially useful information-generating mechanisms are speculative markets. 
Speculative markets produce public information about the perceived likelihood of future events 
as a natural byproduct of voluntary exchange.  
  
  Speculative markets do a remarkable job of aggregating information; in every head-to-
head field comparison made so far, their forecasts have been at least as accurate as those of 
competing institutions, such as official government estimates. Many organizations are now 
trying to take advantage of this effect, experimenting with the creation of “prediction markets” or 
“information markets,” to forecast future events such as product sales and project completion 
dates.  
   This chapter examines the uses and limitations of decision markets. Decision markets are 
information markets designed to inform a particular policy decision, by directly estimating 
relevant consequences of that decision. After reviewing the weaknesses of existing institutions, 
the mechanics of decision markets, and a concrete example, this chapter reviews the 
requirements, advantages, and disadvantages of decision markets. The chapter also takes a close 
look at a particular application of this tool—the controversial yet illuminating attempt to 
establish a “Policy Analysis Market” to forecast the consequences of major policy U.S. choices 









I. Government Information Failures 
 
  There are many ways that governments can fail to achieve good policy outcomes. Some 
interest groups may have too much power or want the wrong things, or leaders may pursue 
personal goals that do not have broad public support. Government agencies may also pursue 
parochial goals or fail to coordinate with each other.  
Most of the government failures that we might overcome, however, are arguably due to a 
lack of information about the consequences of policy choices. Policymakers may have mistaken 
beliefs about the direct effects of a policy. They may fail to consider an indirect effect or an 
alternative policy. Or we might fail at a higher level to choose the right institutions to set the 
context for such judgments and choices. In fact, much of what economists have been doing for 
the past half century is showing how most social problems are at root caused by such information 
failures. For example, there is almost no end to the troubles caused by the principal-agent 
problem—that is, the fact that experts know more than their clients.
1 We rely on doctors, 
lawyers, teachers, and chief executive officers because they can know more than we do. 
Government policy similarly relies heavily on expert knowledge, expressed directly via civil 
servants, contractors, and official boards and commissions, and indirectly via mass media and 
academic reports and analyses.  
We hope that such experts acquire and use their knowledge for our benefit, but we fear 
that they instead give us the advice that benefits them. Stereo salesmen, for example, may 
suggest overly expensive stereos, and surgeons may recommend surgery over drug treatments. 
We cannot trust such experts because of “professional ethics"; if they are trustworthy, it is 
because their institutional and contractual incentives make them so.  
Unfortunately, agency problems in the government-citizen relationship are among the 
worst, because the chains of delegation are so long, the topic coverage is so broad, and citizens 
have so little reason to pay attention. Each election, voters, with little expertise or chance of 
personally influencing the outcome, form judgments about how the policy outcomes they favor 
                                                           
1. John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Harvard Business 
School Press, 1991). 2 
relate to the candidates before them. Representatives, anticipating those judgments and any other 
voter preferences, oversee the agencies that implement government policy. All the way down the 
long chain of delegation, each official tries somewhat to make his part of government look like 
what the officials above him want it to look like.  
To be sure, voters can try to rely on nongovernmental advisors, such as mass media and 
organized political groups, but this merely replaces the problem of evaluating candidates with a 
similar problem of evaluating these advisors, and makes the delegation chain even longer. Those 
who run media firms and organized political groups are professionals, just like politicians and 
CEOs. They compete with others who could replace them and so mostly do whatever it takes to 
build their power, prestige, and profit.  
 Sometimes bad things happen that voters notice that can be attributed to specific actors 
whom voters can remember to punish in a future election. Sometimes good things happen that 
voters can similarly notice, identify, and remember to reward. Where voters are willing to act on 
such clues, government officials have an incentive to avoid these bad things and encourage these 
good things. Ideally, government officials could be well disciplined if a single entity ran the 
government over long terms and if each voter only considered whether his life had gone better or 
worse than expected since the last election.
2
In fact, however, terms are short, government is divided, and voters do not just consider 
their own lives.
3 Voters weigh policy effects on distant others and try to distinguish policy 
influences, and, although these strategies may have some advantages, they can make voter 
information problems far worse. For example, some say the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) tries harder to avoid bad new drugs than delays in good drugs, because the former are far 
more noticeable.
4
Most important, voters have many opinions about the effectiveness of policies and 
process, and the government naturally caters to those opinions. Policy often seems closer to what 
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Model,” in Institutions, Competition and Representation, edited by William Barnett, Norman Schofield, and Melvin 
Hinich (Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
3. David Sears and Carolyn Funk, “Self-Interest in Americans’ Political Opinions,” in Beyond Self-Interest, edited 
by J. Mansbridge (University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 147–70. 
4. Samuel Peltzman, “An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug Amendments,” Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 81, no. 5 (1973): 1049–91. 3 
public opinion would suggest than to what relevant experts advise.
5 Even when governments 
apparently rely on expert opinion, they often do so to legitimate predetermined policies, rather 
than to gain information to help determine policy.
6
A candidate who cares only about winning the next election should neglect what he 
knows about good policy and prefer the policies that voters favor.
7 Of course, this is not just a 
problem with government. A CEO should neglect what he knows about good long-term 
corporate strategy in favor of whatever will impress stock speculators when that CEO exercises 
his stock options.
8 This phenomenon is very general. Experts should not even bother to obtain 
information that their clients will not know when those clients reward the experts.
9  
This problem can, however, be much worse in government. Whereas stock speculators 
can have a strong personal incentive to think carefully about corporate policy, voters not only 
have little reason to think carefully about how to vote, but often have positive reasons to be 
irrational.
10 Yes, voters may need to think about how to deal with the policies that win and may 
want to sound knowledgeable (and compassionate and loyal and much more) when discussing 
politics with associates, but these are far weaker than the incentives of serious stock speculators. 
What can we do about this policy information problem? We could subsidize voter 
education, but education is expensive, only somewhat relevant, and it is hard to keep such 
subsidies politically neutral. We could seek to limit the franchise to the most politically 
informed, but there is little political support for insulting less-informed citizens in this way.  
Another approach would be to educate voters to trust and appreciate the benefits of a new 
policy process. Voters now accept the results of most jury trials not because they have opinions 
on whether the accused was guilty, but because they believe the process is likely to convict the 
guilty. Voters also accept most research funding allocations not because they have opinions 
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10. Bryan Caplan, “Rational Irrationality and the Microfoundations of Political Failure,” Public Choice, vol. 107, 
nos. 3/4 (2001): 311–31. 4 
about which grant proposals should be funded, but because they accept the peer review process 
in research. The public similarly accepts the results of elections, FDA drug approvals, and exams 
for drivers’ licenses, civil service promotion, and college admissions.  
All policy processes, however, do not inspire equal confidence. For example, official 
committee reports are routinely suspected of being biased via the selection of committee 
members, whereas cost-benefit (and other economic) analyses are often suspected of being 
biased via method choices. Statistical analyses fare a bit better, but are still often suspect. These 
cases suggest that voters tend to trust simple informative mechanisms that seem difficult for 
interested parties to bias. 
 
II. How Decision Markets Work 
 
  Decision markets are a new policy mechanism that we might hope will one day be 
accepted by the public as especially simple, informative, and difficult to bias. Decision markets 
are speculative markets that estimate policy consequences.  
Speculation takes place when an actor buys or sells something today in the hope of 
reversing her trade later for a profit. For example, if an actor thinks housing prices are climbing, 
he might buy a house today in the hope of selling it next year at a higher price. But, because it 
costs so much to buy and sell houses, the actor could lose money even if housing prices do rise. 
When durable commodities are traded in markets with low transaction costs, however, 
speculation becomes cheap. These markets are known as speculative markets. For example, if 
you are confident that the price of gold is going up, you are pretty sure to profit from buying gold 
today in order to sell it tomorrow. And if you are confident that the price of gold is going down, 
you can profit by selling today in order to buy tomorrow. (If you do not have gold today, you can 
still sell today by “selling short.”) 
Speculative markets ultimately do an excellent job of aggregating relevant information. 
This is because anyone who thinks they have information about whether the price is going to go 
up or down expects to profit by speculating on that information, and, by speculating on 
information, one incorporates that information into the market price. For example, if you think 
the price is going up, you buy, which tends to raise the price. Speculators thus compete to be the 
first to profit from any new information relevant to predicting future prices. The net result is that, 
when speculative market prices exist, it is hard to find information that such market prices do not 5 
embody. After all, anyone who finds such neglected information can profit by trading on it and 
thereby eliminating this neglect.
11  
Although the information-collecting abilities of speculative markets are impressive, such 
markets are usually created for other reasons, such as to allow traders to entertain or insure 
themselves. One can, however, create new markets specifically to try to take advantage of this 
information-collecting effect. For example, if one wanted to know whether it would rain here 
tomorrow (at place X and on date T), one might create contingent assets that declared “Pays $100 
if rain at place X on date T.” If one could get speculators to trade such assets, and, if their current 
market price was $20, one could take this as an estimate that the probability of rain tomorrow is 
20%. After all, a person unconcerned about risk would be buying or selling this asset if they 
thought the probability of rain was anything other than 20 percent.
12  
Recently some new markets have been created specifically to take advantage of these 
effects. Called prediction markets, information markets, virtual stock markets, artificial markets, 
or idea futures, these markets are now used to estimate measures such as product sales, project 
completion dates, or election outcomes.
13 Sponsors have created both public markets, where 
anyone can trade and learn from the market prices, and private markets, where only a select few 
can trade or see prices. Sponsors have created both markets where people trade hard cash and 
markets where they trade “play money” for bragging rights.  
Such markets (at least the hard cash versions) have so far done well in every known head-
to-head field comparison with other social institutions that forecast. Orange juice futures 
improve on National Weather Service forecasts, horse race markets beat horse race experts, 
Academy Award markets beat columnist forecasts, gas demand markets beat gas demand 
experts, stock markets beat the official NASA panel at fingering the guilty company in the 
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12. One also has to assume that this agent’s utility does not otherwise depend on which outcome is realized. 
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Challenger accident, election markets beat national opinion polls, and corporate sales markets 
beat official corporate forecasts.
14
Although more accurate market-based forecasts can be of great value, it seems that 
market-based policy-conditional forecasts might be of even greater value.
15 Let us now focus on 
this decision market option. 
 
 
III. A Concrete Example 
 
  Consider the oft-heard proposal to change U.S. health insurance into a single-payer 
system (SPS), such as many other developed nations use. Many claims have been made in 
support of such a proposal, but certainly two of the most important claims are that a SPS would 
improve health and reduce costs. Although media and academic analyses and reports have 
weighed in on this subject for many decades, the public remains uncertain about whether a SPS 
would in fact have these consequences.  
Let us focus on the health claim, and in particular on whether average lifespan would be 
increased ten years later if the United States adopted a SPS, relative to if a SPS were not adopted. 
More specifically, imagine the year is 2008, and people disagree about the consequences of a 
particular bill before the U.S. Congress, which would implement a SPS starting in 2010.  
A decision market approach to this problem would create two speculative markets and 
then observe two prices. (We explain exactly how below.) One price would represent an estimate 
of U.S. lifespan in 2020 given that the SPS bill passed, while the other price would represent an 
estimate of U.S. lifespan in 2020 given that the SPS bill did not pass. The difference between 
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these two estimates would say how much market speculators expected this SPS bill to raise or 
lower U.S. lifespan.  
Once the public accepted such market estimates as good policy estimates, the main 
remaining tasks for the public, media, and lobbyists would be to monitor the consistency 
between prices and policy; the policies chosen should seem reasonable given market-specified 
beliefs.
16 For example, a single-payer health insurance system should not be approved if markets 
estimate that it would both raise costs and reduce lifespan, at least when these are the main 
arguments for such a change. Alternatively, we might approve new institutions that more directly 
put market estimates in charge of decisions.
17  
So how would this work exactly? To get decision market estimates on the SPS question 
we would first need to define our measures well enough to settle bets. So we might define U.S. 
average lifespan in 2020 using the official statistics of the U.S. National Vital Statistics System 
in 2022. We might define SPS adoption to mean that the particular SPS bill, however amended, 
was signed into U.S. law during 2009. And we might define the assets being bet to be U.S. 
currency paid in 2022, corrected for officially measured inflation from 2009. Judges would have 
to be appointed to decide about any remaining unanticipated ambiguities.  
Once these measures were defined, one or more financial institutions could create assets 
to represent the relevant bets. One asset would be “Pays $100 if S,” which in 2020 pays 100 
inflation-adjusted U.S. dollars if S—that is, if the SPS bill is passed (and nothing otherwise). A 
second asset would be “Pays $100 if not S.” A financial institution would take no net risk by 
allowing $100 (of inflation-adjusted U.S. dollars in 2020) to be exchanged at anytime for the pair 
“Pays $100 if S” and “Pays $100 if not S.”  
There would also be no net risk in allowing $100 to be exchanged for the pair “Pays $L” 
and “Pays $(100 − L),” where L is U.S. average lifespan in 2020 (or 100 in the unlikely case that 
lifespan were in excess of 100). There would further be no risk in allowing “Pays $L” to be 
exchanged for the pair “Pays $L if S” and “Pays $L if not S.”  
Once such assets were available, we could create the two decision markets to trade them. 
There are many possible market structures. For example, the standard double auction structure 
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supports a single kind of standard trade, such as gold for cash. In the double auction, anyone can 
at anytime post an offer to buy or sell at their chosen price, cancel any of their previous offers, or 
accept one of the best current offers.  
Another option is a simple automated market maker. Such a market maker always has an 
offer to buy a standard quantity at some price and a similar offer to sell at some higher price. The 
market maker sets these prices using a monotonic function of the assets it holds; whenever 
someone accepts the market maker’s sell offer it raises both prices, and whenever someone 
accepts its buy offer the market maker lowers such prices. As information is revealed, the market 
maker should lose on average, but a strict bound can be placed on how much it can ever lose, and 
the gains are given only to those who move the market price toward its ultimate resolution.
18  
Another market structure is a call auction, where offers collect to be matched together at 
the same price. Call auctions have lower price noise, at the cost of a delay in getting prices. 
Combinatorial versions of all these structures can support the combined trading of many 
different related assets. Markets structures also include mechanisms for ensuring that traders can 
and do make good on their offers, and they include choices about who can see what offers and 
trades.  
Whatever the details of the exchange mechanisms, the important thing would be the 
appearance of two market prices, or trading rates of exchange. In the first decision market we 
need, people would exchange one asset “Pays $L if S” for some chosen fraction of the asset 
“Pays $100 if S.” In the second market people would exchange one “Pays $L if not S” for some 
fraction of “Pays $100 if not S.” These fractions could be taken as market estimates of the 
conditional expected values E[L | S] and E[L | not S], respectively. If the first fraction were 
higher than the second, market speculators would be saying that they expect U.S. lifespan to be 
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IV. Requirements for Decision Markets 
 
We have good reasons (including formal theory, lab experiments and field data) to think 
that decision markets can give accurate estimates. But decision markets are not cure-alls; they 
require: 
Important-enough Claims 
 There are fixed costs of using this decision market process. You have to set up markets, 
get traders to pay attention, and so on. Yet, if other forecasting institutions are working well, 
market estimates might only be slightly more accurate than estimates from other institutions. The 
policy question asked thus needs to be important enough for this added accuracy to be worth the 
added fixed costs.  
Careful thought should be given to what question one wants to pose to market 
speculators. If you ask the wrong question, the answer you get may not be very useful. For 
example, if reducing lifespan inequality is as important a benefit of SPS as increasing average 
lifespan, one might want to ask markets about inequality as well. If one cannot afford to ask 
about both, one might ask about a weighted average of the two. 
Enough Influence  
Prices in real markets can contain noise, because of random influences on trader 
incentives and behavior. So the decision options considered need to have a large enough 
influence on the outcomes measured for random price fluctuations not to obscure the relevant 
outcome differences. Decision markets will probably not show how a single act of capital 
punishment affects the murder rate, for example. Averaging prices over a short time may help, 
and simple statistical tests can suggest whether a price difference is statistically significant. 
Distinct Options 
There must be a way after the fact to determine whether a particular decision option was 
chosen or not. One could not ask markets about the consequences of “progressive reform” or 
“using quality standards” unless one could define relatively clearly what would count as such a 
policy. As with the legal system, ambiguities might be dealt with using defaults created by 




There must be a way to create measures of some of the important outcomes of interest 
after the fact and to identify what those measures will be before the fact. Large measurement 
errors are not much of a problem, nor are other influences on the measured outcomes. Instead the 
problems are correlations between errors and the decision and correlations between errors and 
efforts to influence the measurement process.  
One does not need to be able to tell after the fact how much each decision influenced the 
outcome. Standard decision theory is clear that, when you are faced with some options A, and 
you want to achieve the outcome B, you should choose the option A associated with the 
maximum value of your expectation E[B | A]. These summary expectations are all that should 
matter, not the details that produce them.  
Decision-insider Traders 
Standard decision theory is also clear, however, that the relevant expectations E[B | A] 
must be calculated relative to the beliefs of the agent who will actually make the decision. Thus, 
if the people who will actually make the decision have different beliefs from market speculators, 
a decision selection problem can arise.
19 If speculators think that, when the decision is made, 
decisionmakers will know something important that speculators do not now know, speculators 
will use the actual decision as a clue about this important hidden information. The market price 
will then reflect speculators’ best guess about how the world would be given that decision, rather 
than their best guess about how the world will be because of that decision.  
For example, speculators might estimate that on the whole SPS would reduce lifespan, 
but they may also foresee a small chance that the decisionmakers will have surprising 
information favoring SPS. If this scenario is the main way that the decisionmakers might 
approve SPS, speculators should estimate that conditional on seeing SPS be approved, SPS 
would raise lifespan. To avoid this decision selection problem, persons with access to 
decisionmaker information should be permitted to trade in these markets.
20 Also, the timing of 
the key decisions should be clearly announced just before such decisions are made so that 
speculators trading then need not fear the decision will be based on future information.  
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participation in the stock market.  11 
Enough Informed Traders 
Decision markets aggregate information available to their participants, so no minimum 
number of participants is needed, nor is there a minimum level of participant information. With a 
subsidized market maker, even a single trader can profit by making the market price express 
what little he knows. At the other extreme, by inducing more traders to put in more effort, there 
is often no obvious limit on how accurate prices might become.  
Thus, it only makes sense to ask if there are “enough” informed traders relative to some 
standard of comparison. If anything below a given accuracy is useless, you need traders with 
enough information to produce that accuracy. If decision markets are being compared with a 
competing institution, some of the people with the sort of information available to that 
competing institution must be allowed to trade in the decision markets.  
Although the accuracy of some forecasting institutions, such as polls, depends on the 
information level of the average participant, the accuracy of speculative markets depends more 
on the most informed participants; the typical person able to trade need not be informed or even 
rational. Instead, a small group whose members know they are better informed can dominate 
prices, as long as they have enough resources and if market rules do not artificially limit how 
much they can trade. Those who know they are less informed tend to back away, and those who 
do not know that they do not know tend to lose and then back away.  
Enough Trader Incentives 
Even when people with access to relevant information are able to trade, such people need 
a reason to bother to trade, relative to the other ways they could spend their time and money. 
They might trade for insurance, for fun and sport, or because of an irrational overconfidence in 
their opinions; however, when people expect few others to trade in a market, they may all stay 
away, and so a market price may fail to exist.  
Fortunately, one can ensure market prices exist either via a large enough financial 
subsidy to fund an automated market maker, or via a large enough chance market prices would 
influence important decisions. The larger the subsidy or influenced decision, the more incentives 
traders acquire, and the more accurate prices should be. If individuals vary how much they enjoy 
trading, or in their cost of trading or acquiring relevant information, prices should also be more 
accurate when more people are allowed to participate.  12 
 There is also the question of whether the assets risked are ordinary highly convertible 
“real money” assets or “play-money” assets of limited convertibility, where winners mainly win 
bragging rights. Most of the successes of speculative markets have been for open unlimited 
mostly anonymous trading of highly convertible assets. But legal barriers are much lower for 
play-money, and some research has found play-money markets can do as well real-money 
markets, at least on topics where many people already acquire relevant information for other 
reasons.
21  
Trader Anonymity  
Even when the benefits from trading are large enough to overcome the costs of bothering, 
threats of retribution could deter participation. Leaders of a government agency, for example, 
might retaliate against employees who contradicted their official party line in decision markets. 
Such retaliation can be prevented, however, if people can trade and gain their trading rewards 
anonymously.  
Aggregate-enough Outcomes 
Even if prices are accurate reflections of reality, would that accuracy come at the cost of 
people changing reality, by hurting others to win bets? Such acts of harm might come if people 
were betting on events small enough for individuals or small groups to influence. Fortunately, it 
is very difficult for individuals or small groups to have much influence over typical policy 
aggregates, such as average U.S. lifespan. Furthermore, we do not really see much in the way of 
attempts to harm in order to profit from trades on the stocks of amusement parks, hospitals, or 
other companies that individuals or small groups might plausibly effect.
22  
It seems that the sort of people who are willing and able to cause harm do not have access 
to the capital required to implement such trading strategies; they usually prefer simple extortion. 
And decision markets should cause far less temptation because they involve far less money than 
ordinary financial markets. Thus, decision markets should be safe as long as they stay away from 
estimating parameters that are too easily influenced by individual criminals.
23  
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Linear-enough Outcomes 
If policymakers look to decision market prices as a guide to policy, others may be 
tempted to manipulate those prices in order to manipulate policy. Fortunately, the addition of 
manipulators should increase price accuracy. Manipulators are in essence noise traders, because 
their trades are not correlated with asset value information, and markets with more noise traders 
generally have more accurate prices, because more informed traders are attracted to profit from 
the noise traders.
24 This predicted inability of manipulators to hurt price accuracy has been 
confirmed by lab experiments and in the field.
25  
It is theoretically possible, however, for manipulation to increase the harm from price 
errors even as it increases price accuracy. For example, a market estimating the probability of 
some disaster might better estimate the probability of disaster, but do worse at catching the worse 
disasters. A simple way to avoid this possibility is to trade assets whose payoffs are relatively 
linear in the relevant harm.  
Conditional-enough Outcomes 
One important aspect of asking the right question is avoiding self-fulfilling prophecies. 
For example, imagine that the market estimated that a new ambitious government computer 
system would be delivered late, and in response the contract was renegotiated to make the system 
less ambitious so it could be delivered on time. This would punish the market speculators for 
giving their valuable forecast. A better approach is to ask about outcomes conditional on the 
relevant policy responses. In this example, one could ask the market about the system delivery 
date conditional on not changing the contract and then conditional on some change in the 
contract. This approach would reward speculators for giving good advice. 
Intermediate-enough Estimates 
Speculative markets sometimes seem to show “long-shot” biases when estimates are 
extreme. For example, when estimating the probability of an unlikely event, those who want to 
raise the probability of that event have to spend a lot less in each trade than people who want to 
lower the probability. This can result in a bias toward less-extreme prices, at least when 
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transaction costs are high enough to discourage attempts by other speculators to profit by 
correcting such biases. 
Low transaction costs can reduce this problem, as can allowing combinatorial trading. 
With combinatorial trading, high probability outcomes can be broken down into lots of low-
probability components, so all components traded have a similar probability.  
Can Show Prices 
 It is more difficult (though hardly impossible) for traders to inform prices when they 
cannot observe recent market prices, but such prices reveal to observers something close to our 
best estimates at that point in time of the consequences of our choices. If we do not want 
potential “adversaries” to know these estimates, we may want to limit who is allowed to trade or 
how recent are the prices they can observe. Such limitations are possible, but probably cost 
something in the way of price accuracy. 
Legal Permission 
The cost of following the legal process to gain permission to open a few markets to 
evaluate a policy must be smaller than the benefits that an interest group might gain from 
advocating that policy. Otherwise no one will bother to set up markets in the hopes of convincing 
the rest of us of the value of their proposal. Unfortunately, legal fixed costs are far too high for 
this condition to hold today, at least for real money markets. 
Public Credibility 
   The policy audience must perceive decision market estimates to be relatively accurate 
and difficult for interested parties to bias. In a democratic government, this means the public 
must accept such market processes similar to they way they now accept jury trials as a reliable 
neutral forum for policy debate. This condition does not yet hold today. 
 
V. Advantages of Decision Markets 
 
Decision markets can directly advise our important policy decisions, by giving us more 
accurate estimates of the aggregate consequences of those decisions. Decision market price 
estimates should be numerical, precise, respond quickly to new information, be self-consistent 
across a wide range of issues, and be at least as accurate as other publicly available estimates. 15 
They are also relatively democratic in the sense of allowing anyone to participate and yet are 
relatively difficult for interested parties to bias.  
Estimates based on cost-benefit or statistical analyses are often criticized as out being of 
date, being based on bad modeling assumptions or data sets, misjudging causality directions, or 
failing to control for relevant parameters. Market estimates are mostly immune to these 
criticisms. Although the analyses that individual traders use to choose their trades may well have 
these problems, it is up to traders to make their best judgments to fix them. Anyone who could 
identify a bias in any aspect of the current market estimates would in effect be offered a financial 
reward to correct that bias.  
The cost of creating decision markets does not vary greatly from topic to topic. Most of 
the variation is probably based on whether information is spread out among many people and on 
how many people know any given relevant piece of information. The benefit of creating decision 
markets varies enormously, however, with the importance of the decision being advised. Thus, 
the most benefit relative to cost will come from decision markets advising the largest most 
important decisions, where existing forecasting institutions have serious failings.  
Early decision markets attempts, however, tend naturally to be efforts to validate the 
technology. For validation efforts it makes more sense to look for policy decision contexts in 
which a status quo institution gives concrete enough forecasts to allow a numerical comparison, 
where that status quo institution is suspected of serious failings, and where many similar 
decisions have consequences that will be known within a few years. This is where decision 
markets have their best chance of clearly demonstrating a superior forecasting accuracy.  
 
VI. Disadvantages of Decision Markets 
 
For now, decision markets have two overwhelming disadvantages. First, decision markets 
have not yet gained enough credibility in the public mind to be an attractive forum in which to 
argue for particular policy choices. And second, there are enormous legal barriers preventing the 
creation of public markets trading hard currency.  
If these problems can be overcome, other disadvantages will remain. For example, the 
public may not always want more neutral and accurate forecasts of the consequences of policy 
decisions. The public may have self-flattering beliefs, ideologies, and entrenched opinions about 16 
policy consequences, and they may not appreciate being contradicted by decision markets; 
sometimes people do prefer to shoot the messenger. Also, the public may have nonoutcome 
preferences over the processes that produce their policy estimates and over the people who 
influence it. Accuracy may not be the only issue the public cares about.  
Even when the public truly does want more accurate forecasts about policy 
consequences, more disadvantages will remain. Decision markets have nontrivial costs, such as 
to carefully define relevant options and outcomes and to induce informed traders to participate. 
And decision markets have nontrivial limitations, such as needing distinct anticipated options 
which have enough influence over measured aggregate-enough, linear-enough, and conditional-
enough outcomes.  
 
 
VII. Policy Analysis Market: A Case Study 
 
An interesting and well-publicized decision market was the now-defunct. Policy Analysis 
Market, also known as “terrorism futures” or “terror betting.”
26 In 2000, Michael Foster, who ran 
the National Science Foundation quantum computing research program, convinced DARPA (the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the blue-sky research arm of the U.S. Defense 
Department) to fund research on information markets starting in 2001.  
This research program was eventually named “FutureMAP,” but the first DARPA call for 
proposals went out under the name “Electronic Market-Based Decision Support.” The call 
basically said, “We’ve heard this works elsewhere; show us it works for problems we care 
about.” The call went out in May 2001, for proposals due in August, and by December two firms 
had won SBIR (small business independent research) grants. The first winner was Neoteric 
Technologies, subcontracting to Martek and professors at the University of Iowa. The second 
winner was Net Exchange, founded by a Caltech professor and subcontracting to two George 
Mason University professors, and later also to the Economist Intelligence Unit. The Net 
Exchange project was later named the "Policy Analysis Market" (PAM). 
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The plan was for two firms to receive $100,000 for a six-month phase I, and after which 
one of them would be awarded $750,000 to continue phase II over two more years. There was 
also the possibility of receiving $100,000 for the six months between these phases. More money 
became available than initially planned, so in fall 2002 both firms were funded to continue to 
phase II, and Net Exchange applied for and won between-phase funding. Also during 2002, the 
infamous John Poindexter, convicted in the Iran-Contra scandal, became a DARPA executive. 
Foster's FutureMAP program was placed within Poindexter's organization, the Information 
Awareness Office (IAO). In December 2002, DARPA called for proposals for related research, 
at this point using the name FutureMAP. In summer 2003, a half dozen teams—at Penn State, 
Metron, Institute for Counter-Terrorism, George Mason University, Sparta, and BBN 
Technologies —were awarded $100,000 each. 
Neotek sponsored an end of phase I conference in June 2002, and showed a few 
demonstration markets, using their preexisting software, on SARS and the color security threat 
level. When FutureMAP was canceled, Neotek had still not identified their market topics and had 
probably spent less than half of their phase II funding. Net Exchange spent about two-thirds of 
its phase II funding, and the new small projects had spent little of their funding. Michael Foster 
had asked for, but not received, $8,000,000 more in FutureMAP funding over the next few years. 
From the very start, the Net Exchange team began laboratory experiments on price 
manipulation, as this was a widely expressed concern. Also from the start, they planned to 
forecast military and political instability around the world, how U.S. policies would affect such 
instability, and how such instability would influence U.S. and global aggregates of interest.
27 The 
reasoning behind this choice was that the cost to create markets does not depend much on the 
topic, but the value of estimates varies enormously with the topic. Thus, the greatest benefit 
relative to cost would come from the highest value estimates. And what could be more valuable 
than to inform the largest defense policy decisions? 
Charles Polk, Net Exchange president, named this the Policy Analysis Market (PAM). 
The focused later narrowed to a smaller region, the Mideast, because the Economist Intelligence 
Unit charged a high price to judge after the fact what instability had actually occurred in each 
nation. 
                                                           
27. It was my job to survey possible application areas and recommend one. I recommended this one.  18 
The final plan was to cover eight nations. For each nation in each quarter of a year (over 
the two year final phase), traders would estimate five parameters: its military activity, political 
instability, economic growth, U.S. military activity, and U.S. financial involvement. In addition 
traders would predict U.S. GDP, world trade, U.S. military casualties, and western terrorist 
casualties, and a few to-be-determined miscellaneous items. (The miscellaneous items were to be 
decided at the last minute based on suggestions from traders, with approval by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit.) This would add up to a few hundred base parameters to estimate.  
In addition, they planned to let traders predict combinations of these, such has how 
moving U.S. troops out of Saudi Arabia would affect political stability there, how that would 
affect stability in neighboring nations, and how all that might change oil prices. Similar trades 
could have predicted the local and global consequences of invading Iraq, had the markets been 
ready then. 
For many years before PAM, Net Exchange had specialized in combinatorial markets, 
where buyers and sellers could exchange complex packages of items. So from the start, the plan 
was to see how far they could go in developing combinatorial prediction markets. In phase I, Net 
Exchange put together a combinatorial market similar to their previous combinatorial markets, 
and at the end of phase I they ran a complex simulation in which a dozen students traded over a 
few days for real money. Unfortunately, only about a dozen trades occurred, a serious failure. 
In the interim phase, the Net Exchange team prepared for and ran lab experiments 
comparing two new combinatorial trading mechanisms with each other and with a traditional 
mechanism. These experiments had three traders set seven independent prices in three minutes, 
and then had six traders set 255 independent prices in three minutes. They found that a 
combinatorial market maker was the most accurate.
28 Phase II was mostly being spent 
implementing a scalable production version of this market maker. Because this mechanism 
requires a net subsidy to traders, they had budgeted $50,000 for this subsidy, and individual bets 
were to be limited to a few tens of dollars. 
The PAM team was concerned that they might not attract enough traders in the final 
phase to achieve a meaningful test. Team members had considered running markets within 
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government agencies, but found strong legal barriers to conditional transfers of money between 
agencies. In the absence of a single agency strongly interested in collaborating with them, they 
choose to create public markets.  
On May 20, 2003, DARPA reported to Congress on the IAO, and described FutureMAP 
in terms of predicting a bioweapons attack against Israel. In June 2003, the PAM team began to 
tell people about their Web page and to give talks to drum up interest. Charles Polk created the 
PAM Web site, wherein as a backdrop to bold text, there were faint background sample screens. 
In a small (less than 2 percent) section of two such screens, he included as colorful examples of 
possible miscellaneous items an Arafat assassination, a North Korea missile attack, and the king 
of Jordan being overthrown. 
In the summer of 2003, the Senate but not the House had canceled IAO funding, which 
included all FutureMAP support, because of privacy concerns with another IAO project, “Total 
Information Awareness.” Because of this funding uncertainty, the PAM plans then were to start 
on September 1 with 100 testers, who would each be given $100 to trade. Online registration of 
people interested in being testers was to open August 1, and public trading of as many as 1,000 
initial traders was to begin January 1, 2004. The fact that the PAM team was acting as an agent 
of the Pentagon was going to give them legal protection against violating antigambling laws. 
On July 28, 2003, Senators Ron Wyden (Democrat, Oregon) and Byron Dorgan 
(Democrat, North Dakota) released an open letter to John Poindexter in which they complained 
that the U.S. Department of Defense was planning a “terror market” for people to bet on terrorist 
attacks.
29 They emphasized PAM’s association with John Poindexter, who actually had little 
involvement with PAM, and described PAM as being “designed to predict terrorist events,” 
when in fact it was focused on geopolitical trends.  Their main evidence was those miscellaneous 
items in the PAM website background screen. 
Wyden and Dorgan mainly complained that “terrorists themselves could drive up the 
market for an event they are planning and profit from an attack, or even make false bets to 
mislead intelligence authorities.” Yet a few tens of dollars would hardly pay for an attack, and 
the PAM team had already told DARPA about their lab experiments showing manipulators do 
not hurt price accuracy.  
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A media storm immediately ensued. Although five mostly positive media articles 
mentioning PAM had appeared in the previous few months, fifty mostly negative articles 
appeared on July 29. DARPA public relations person was out of town and unreachable when the 
story broke. So DARPA was silent, and initial media reports were based mostly on the senators’ 
complaint.  
On July 29, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz told the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee that he first heard of PAM reading the newspaper a few hours before and 
that the project was being terminated.
30 During that crucial previous day, no one from the 
government asked the PAM team whether the accusations were correct or whether the more 
offensive aspects could be cut from the project. Many slow wheels of government had begun to 
turn. For example, the president’s Council of Economic Advisors was considering coming out in 
favor of PAM, but the political decision to abandon PAM was made quickly, at a high level, and 
based on little information or lower-level input.  
On July 30, seventy-eight media articles on PAM appeared, even more negative. That 
day, Poindexter reportedly resigned, and two months later all IAO research was ended. Over the 
following days, weeks, months, and years, more than 600 more media articles have mentioned 
PAM, many at first, and then gradually fading in frequency.  
An analysis of over 500 articles on PAM found that coverage gradually became more 
positive, and the most recent fifty articles on average give readers a positive impression of PAM. 
One can collect eleven indicators of how informative were the articles about PAM. These 
indicators include publication date, citing someone with firsthand knowledge, article length, a 
news or an editorial style, author anonymity, and the awards, circulation, frequency, and topic 
specialties of the periodical. All eleven indicators individually predict that more informed 
articles give readers a more favorable impression of PAM. In a multiple regression model using 
additional six control variables, including media types, political leaning, and author gender, all 
six of the clearly significant information indicators predict that more informed articles favor 
PAM more. The more informed articles were more favorable, and eventually the average article 
was favorable, but the political decision to cancel PAM seems unlikely to be reversed anytime 
soon.  
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Psychological research by Philip Tetlock and others on “taboo tradeoffs” can help us to 
make sense of this unusual political event.
31 Tetlock and others study how people react upon 
learning that they, or others, have crossed a moral boundary and traded the sacred for the secular. 
They find that people are not only outraged at anyone who would cross such a moral boundary, 
but are almost as outraged at someone who would even think about crossing such a boundary.  
For example, people might be given a description of a hospital administrator who is 
considering cutting costs at the possible risk of patient lives. Such people are then outraged at an 
administrator who chooses to cut costs, regardless of the financial situation of the hospital or the 
ratio of money saved to lives risked. Furthermore, they are almost as outraged at an administrator 
who takes several days to think about the decision, even if he ends up not cutting costs. 
Apparently someone who would even think of doing such a thing is considered nearly as morally 
bankrupt as someone who actually does it. Bush had long defended Poindexter against attacks on 
his “Total Information Awareness” project, widely criticized as an attempt to collect and 
integrate databases on the public, but defending PAM seemed to have been beyond the pale.  
PAM seems to have been accused of crossing a moral boundary, which can be 
paraphrased roughly as “none of us should intend to benefit when some of them hurt some of 
us.” (Yes, many of us do in fact benefit from terrorist attacks; but we can plausibly argue that we 
did not intend to do so.) So, by the taboo tradeoff effect, it was morally unacceptable for anyone 
in Congress or the administration to take a few days to think about the accusation. The moral 
calculus required an immediate response. 
Of course, no one at high decisionmaking levels knew much about a $1 million research 
project within a $1 trillion government budget. If PAM had been a $1 billion project, 
representatives from districts where that money was spent might have considered whether to 
defend the project. But there was no such incentive for a $1 million project (spend mostly in 
California and London); the safe political response was obvious: repudiate PAM, and all 
associated with it, especially Poindexter. Anticipating this outcome, the attack appears to have 
been made in order to embarrass the Bush administration via their association with the freshly 
vilified Poindexter, and by tainting them as being a bit too mad about markets.  
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Since FutureMAP began under Clinton, it would probably have progressed similarly, had 
Gore beaten Bush in the closest presidential election in U.S. history. Gore would not have 
appointed Poindexter, and Republicans would not have tried to paint Gore as too mad about 




Problems of acquiring and aggregating information on policy consequences lie at the core 
of most political failures, and these problems are often quite severe. Decision markets are a new 
policy information process intended to help overcome these problems. If our experience with 
similar markets is any guide, decision markets would be at least as accurate as any coexisting 
policy information process. Such markets are also precise, consistent, responsive, difficult to 
bias, and equalitarian in the sense of allowing broad participation.   
  Decision markets are not cure-alls, of course. They will not function effectively without 
the ability to create distinct options that have a measurable influence on relevant aggregate 
outcomes, and the problem has to be important enough to be worth paying to give traders, some 
of them insiders, enough incentive to trade. The legal costs of market creation also must be low 
enough, and the public must see market estimates as credible, accurate, and neutral. 
It is these last two conditions that remain the biggest problem for decision markets. 
Without lower legal costs we will not see many trials, and without successful trials the approach 
cannot gain enough public credibility. Yet without that public credibility there is not enough 
political support to pass a bill to lower those legal costs to allow more trials. 
The history of the aborted Policy Analysis Market shows that, absent such credibility, 
decision markets can be misrepresented and turned into political poison. This vulnerability of a 
market mechanism to such an attack should not be too surprising. After all, most familiar 
financial products, including stocks, insurance, futures, and options markets, were once 
prohibited by laws against gambling. It took a long time for the relevant industries to convince 
the public to see each of these products as not “just gambling.” Of course, all of these products 
are ways to gamble, but, because they serve useful social functions, they have become politically 
and morally acceptable. Similarly, decision markets can also serve an important social function, 
especially when applied to government policy. Unfortunately, there is no large industry yet with 23 
an interest in lobbying the public to see decision markets as more than gambling. In light of 
elected officials’ fear of making the same political mistake twice, the PAM experience is 
unlikely to be repeated anytime soon. Nevertheless, decision markets remain a potentially 
valuable, if still maturing, tool for analysis of complex problems. A revival of decision markets 
in the public sector will likely have to wait for a new generation of politicians, or perhaps some 
stunning successes with these mechanisms in the private sector. But eventually, perhaps after 
they have repeatedly demonstrated their superior information-producing capacities in relatively 
uncontroversial contexts, decision markets may yet be allowed to revolutionize the way we make 
high value policy decisions.  
 
 
 
 